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ABSTRACT
Current anonymizing networks have become an important
tool for guaranteeing users’ privacy. However, these plat-
forms can be used to perform illegitimate actions, which
sometimes makes service providers see traffic coming from
these networks as a probable threat. In order to solve this
problem, we propose to add support for fairness mechanisms
to the Tor network. Specifically, by introducing a slight
modification to the key negotiation process with the entry
and exit nodes, in the shape of group signatures. By means
of these signatures, we set up an access control method to
prevent misbehaving users to make use of the Tor network.
Additionally, we establish a predefined method for denounc-
ing illegitimate actions, which impedes the application of
the proposed fairness mechanisms as a threat eroding users’
privacy. As a direct consequence, traffic coming from Tor
would be considered less suspicious by service providers.
1. INTRODUCTION
Privacy has become a major concern for Internet users.
One main approach for enabling privacy is the introduction
of anonymizing techniques, and Tor [17] is probably the most
popular and widely used anonymizing network.
Tor anonymizes communications by avoiding origin and
recipient to be linked. Moreover, even the recipient can-
not learn the IP address of the originator by analyzing the
received packets. This is achieved by re-routing the data
through several intermediaries, the Onion Routers, and adding
an extra layer of encryption with each one. Nevertheless,
this also reduces the protection available for the addressee,
since it cannot denounce the originator or even block him.
This is certainly a factor hindering any wide acceptance of
anonymizing networks. Moreover, it causes users acting le-
gitimately to be affected by the illegitimate actions of oth-
ers. For instance, in some situations legitimate users cannot
access a site through Tor, because that site directly bans
Tor-originated traffic.
In this work we use group signatures to extend the func-
tionality of Tor’s entry and exit nodes in order to enable
the tracing and blocking of misbehaving users. This being
the case, we implement an access control mechanism for Tor
which does not deteriorate the normal use of the Tor net-
work by users acting legitimately. As a consequence of this
fairness1 mechanism, service providers would probably in-
crease their trust in Tor, since illegitimate actions coming
1According to [22], with fairness we refer to the capability of
taking any measure that could prevent anonymity misuses.
from Tor would presumably be reduced.
Section 2 summarizes some data evidencing that irrevo-
cable anonymity and unlinkability may be seen as a threat,
or something undesirable, in some situations, and in Section
3, we summarize some related work. We then describe our
approach for incorporating fairness into the Tor network in
Section 5. Section 6 points out to some open issues that are
important to take into account for realizing our proposal. Fi-
nally, Section 7 concludes with a summary of our proposal.
Throughout this short paper we assume a basic knowledge
of Tor essentials. For a more detailed description of Tor, we
refer to [17] or the Tor project website2.
2. MISTRUST IN COMPLETE ANONYMITY
Despite the fact that an obvious use of communications
anonymity is to protect users’ privacy, it can also be mis-
used. For instance, in [24] the authors run a Tor exit node
for gathering statistical evidence for a further analysis of
Tor’s traffic. They conclude stating that it is not uncommon
to see “hacking attempts, allegations of copyright infringe-
ments, and bot network control channels” routed through
Tor. Another type of behavior that may be considered as
undesirable is the use of the Tor platform for purposes other
than the originally intended ones, even though they might
not be against any ethical rule. This is reported in [10] as a
result of analyzing the traffic going through several Tor exit
nodes, and concluding that an important share of the pack-
ets being routed through Tor corresponds to BitTorrent traf-
fic (roughly the 25%). This reflects that in the case of willing
to limit this use of Tor, little more than actually blocking all
the BitTorrent traffic could be done. This would be unfair to
users routing BitTorrent traffic through Tor but consuming a
moderate portion of the available bandwidth. Hence, a finer
control on this type of “misbehavior” is also desirable. More
evidence supporting the claim that the anonymity provided
by Tor can be (and is being) misused is the fact that there
already exist services, like BlockScript3, which include ex-
plicit functionality for blocking traffic, including data com-
ing from Tor and other anonymizing networks (BlockScript,
offers a commercial service for blocking “unwanted” traffic
and sells the raw blacklist data for $12,000 per year). An
interesting discussion about the necessity of accountability
in anonymous communication systems is done in [14]. Fi-
nally, the risk of failure due to websites blocking Tor has
also been considered by the Tor staff too in a recent post
2https://www.torproject.org
3http://www.blockscript.com/features.php.
in the Tor Project blog: “A call to arms: Helping Internet
services accept anonymous users”4.
Furthermore there is an abuse specific FAQ in the official
Tor website5 dealing with the subject.
3. RELATED WORK
Several systems have been proposed to endow anonymiz-
ing platforms with fairness mechanisms. BLAC [29] makes
use of a specific group signature scheme in order to allow ser-
vice providers to manage their own blacklists, following their
own judgment when it comes to block users. Nymble [30]
creates a complex infrastructure in order to provide fairness
by revoking the unlinkability of users who misbehave. In
PEREA [2], the need of Trusted Third Parties is eliminated
at the cost of creating a highly crafted infrastructure in order
to allow users to be blocked. EPID [7] makes unlinkability
revocation possible by either using a member private key, a
signature issued by the member to revoke, or by consulting
the issuer of the member key. However, it requires the usage
of Trusted Privacy Modules [28], which we consider out of
the scope of our proposal.
These systems also take into account that different mis-
behaviors are possible and, in the case of PEREA, that
each misbehavior should be assigned a different severity (the
PEREA-Naughtiness variant). Nevertheless, they would prob-
ably be too rigid for multi-purpose contexts where different
legitimate uses and revocation needs are possible. For in-
stance, Nymble just supports unlinkability revocation dur-
ing a predefined interval. BLAC is tied up to a specific
group signature scheme, that might not be appropriate for
some situations. PEREA limits the number of authentica-
tions that users may perform during a time span, blacklist-
ing them if they exceed that limit. Hence, any change on
the implemented functionality that may be necessary for the
adoption of these systems into a new context would probably
require a great effort.
Our proposal takes advantage of the wide variety of group
signatures and the standardization process that anonymous
certificates based on them are being subject to [3, 15, 8, 20].
These would allow a high flexibility for modifying the desired
functionality depending on the context and, at the same
time, the minimization of the deployment costs.
4. BUILDING BLOCKS
We use the notation 〈OA, OB〉 ← Pro(IC)[A(IA), B(IB)]
to describe a two-party process Pro between parties A and
B, where OA (resp. OB) is the output to party A (resp.
B), IC is the common input, and IA (resp. IB) is A’s (resp.
B’s) private input; when party B does not have output,
we sometimes write OA ← Pro(IC)[A(IA), B(IB)]. Single-
party processes are denoted by O ← Pro(I), with input I
and output O. Also, for readability, we omit the publicly
known keys in the process calls. Finally, since we contin-
uously deal with different types of signatures, we use the
Greek letter σ for denote a signature produced by some of
the schemes described below (the specific type is clear given
the notation in the following subsections).
4.1 Group signatures
4https://blog.torproject.org/blog/call-arms-
helping-internet-services-accept-anonymous-users.
5https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq-abuse.html.en.
Group signatures, first proposed by Chaum and Van Heyst
[12], allow a member of a group to issue a signature such that
any possible verifier can check that it has been issued by a
member of the group, without revealing which specific mem-
ber issued it. More advanced schemes have been proposed
since then [9, 22, 23], improving the scalability and efficiency
of group signatures, but also their functionality. Current
schemes allow unlinkability revocation and anonymity revo-
cation. Normally, these revocations can only be performed
by suitable authorities, but there exist schemes that intro-
duce interesting variants to this behavior, allowing unlinka-
bility revocation only for users who have broken some rule
(like exceeding the maximum number of messages to sign
[27]).
To summarize, a group of a group signature scheme is
basically composed by: a group manager who owns a secret
group manager keyMK and publishes a group key GK; and
a set of N members each in possession of a member keymki,
for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Overall, the main operations supported by a
group signature scheme may be summarized as follows:
MK,GK ← GS.Setup(1k). Run by the group manager, cre-
ates the group key and the manager key.
mki ← GS.Join[U(secret),M(MK)]. Executed jointly be-
tween a new user U and the group manager M , allows
new users to join the group, obtaining a member key.
σ ← GS.Sign(msg,mki). A user creates a group signature
over a message, using her member key.
b← GS.Verify(σ,msg). Allows anyone with the group key
to verify a group signature.
trapdoor← GS.Open(σ,MK). Run by the group manager,
allows him to obtain de-anonymize to some extent the
issuer of a group signature, given the group signature
itself, the manager key and, normally, some additional
private information. In some schemes, the only pos-
sibility is to retrieve her real identity. In others, it is
possible to obtain a token which permits to link group
signatures made by the same user. For simplicity, in
this work we encompass all variants that somehow re-
duce anonymity under the term Open.
b← GS.Trace(σ,MK). Allows to verify if a given group sig-
nature has been issued by some arbitrary member. In
order to run this operation, GS.Open needs to be exe-
cuted before. Thus, note that there may be different
ways to achieve this, according to the variants of the
GS.Open functionality.
However, this can be considered a“general working mode”
of a group signature scheme. For a good review of the main
advancements in the field of group signatures, we refer to
[23, Section 1.1].
4.2 Blind signatures
Blind signatures where introduced by Chaum in [11]. Ba-
sically, a blind signature scheme allows a user U to obtain
a signature from a signer S over any arbitrary message m,
but without S learning anything about m. This idea has
been used since then for creating diverse privacy respectful
systems. However, since the signer does not learn any in-
formation about the message, systems based on them can
easily be abused. For solving this issue, fair blind signatures
were proposed in [26]. In this variant, an authority has priv-
ileged information allowing the signer to link message and
signature pairs. Restrictive blind signatures [6] allow issu-
ing blind signatures, but only choosing among messages that
comply certain rules. Finally, an also important alternative
is given by partially blind signatures [1]. In a partially blind
signature the messages are divided in two parts: a com-
mon message to which the S has complete access; and the
blinded message, of which S does not learn anything. Thus,
the common message may be employed to implement mis-
use prevention mechanisms. As always, several schemes have
appeared improving the overall efficiency, reducing the size
of the final signatures, or based on different number theory
problems [21, 13, 25, 5].
Although some of the variants of blind signatures would
probably be useful for our proposal, we use the general defi-
nition of a blind signature for describing it. Thus, hereafter
we will use the following notation when referring to the op-
erations of a blind signature scheme:
(pbk, sbk)← BS.Setup(1k). Creates the signer’s public pbk
and private keys sbk for issuing blind signatures.
(β, pi)← BS.Blind(msg, secret). Using some random secret
value, the user creates a blinded version (β) of the
message to be blindly signed and a proof of correctness
pi.
β˜ ← BS.Sign(β, sbk). Upon receiving the blinded messages,
the signer runs any necessary verification and creates
a blinded signature using its private key.
σ ← BS.Unblind(β˜, secret). The user receives the blinded
signature and unblinds it, using the secret value gen-
erated during the blind process. The result of this
operation is the final signature.
b← BS.Verify(σ,msg). Any entity runs this operation to
verify the signature.
4.3 Blind group signatures
A blind group signature scheme is just like a blind signa-
ture in which the signer issues a group signature instead of
a conventional signature. Therefore, each of the operations
described in the previous sections may be independently ap-
plied in this schemes. However, for the sake of clarity, when
referring to this schemes, we will use the prefix BGS instead
of GS or BS.
4.4 Additional cryptographic primitives
Besides the primitives introduced above, we assume read-
ers are familiar with public-key encryption, digital signa-
ture and commitment schemes, and zero-knowledge proofs
of knowledge. We use com ← Com(m, r) to denote a com-
mitment com to a message m, where the sender uses uniform
random coins r; the sender can open the commitment by
sending (m, r) to the receiver. We use pi ← ProveZK(x,w)
and VerifyZK(x, pi) to refer to creating non-interactive proof
pi showing that the statement x is in the language (which
will be determined by the context) with the witness w, and
to verifying the statement x based on the proof pi.
5. GUIDELINES FOR INCORPORATING
FAIRNESS INTO TOR
In order to endow Tor with fairness capabilities, the en-
try and exit nodes take a central role, since they are the
only nodes who learn the IP addresses of the user entering
the network and that of the final destination, respectively.
Hence, their knowledge would be necessary to determine
whether the IP trying to access the network has already
been blocked, or to demonstrate that a given origin IP has
accessed certain destination IP. However, when proposing
modifications of those nodes we must avoid enabling attacks
based on establishing a connection between them. For that
purpose, we take advantage of both the way the user nego-
tiates keys with the Tor nodes, and the properties of group
and blind signatures.
Hereafter, we assume that a group has already been set
up, and that there is a suitable policy established for fairly
managing revocation (see Section 6). Similarly, we assume
that the blind signature scheme has also been set up. Table
1 summarizes the notation used throughout the rest paper,
along with some notation inherited from the description of
the Tor network [17] and the notation defined for group and
blind signatures and the additional cryptographic primitives
in Section 4.
{·}K Symmetric encryption with key K
{·}PKA Asymmetric encryption with A’s public key.
{{·}} Layered encryptions following the Tor protocol.
H(·) Application of a cryptographic hash function.
gx· The user’s Diffie-Hellman share.
gy· The Diffie-Hellman share corresponding to a Tor node.
hsK A transcription of the handshake for key K.
A|B A concatenated with B.
σ1 Group signature of g
x1 sent to entry node.
σ2 Group signature of g
x2 sent to exit node.
β Blinded version of σ2
β˜ Blindly signed version of β
σ3 Blind signature of σ2
Table 1: Notation summary.
Our approach works by introducing variations in the way
a user negotiates the symmetric keys with the entry and
exit nodes. In short, we will require the user to group-sign
the message sent during negotiation with the entry and exit
nodes. In addition, in order to prevent the user to employ
one identity for negotiating with the entry node, and a dif-
ferent one with the exit node (see Section 6), the entry node
has to blindly sign the message that the user will send to the
exit node. The resulting modified handshake schemes (see
[17, p. 6]) are shown below, where Ui denotes any arbitrary
user, EN denotes the entry node and EX the exit node. Dur-
ing the handshake with EN, Ui first group-signs g
x1 and gx2 ,
sends gx1 to EN and also requests EN to blindly sign a group
signature of gx2 . If all the operations succeed, ENaccepts the
connection.
Entry Node Handshake:
Ui: σ1 ← GS.Sign(g
x1 ,mki)
Ui: σ2 ← GS.Sign(g
x2 ,mki)
Ui: com ← Com(σ2, r1)
Ui: (β, pi)← BGS.Blind(com, r2)
Ui: φ← ProveZK(x,w) where
x = (β, pi, σ1), w = (mki, r1, r2) such that:
σ2 ← GS.Sign(g
x2 ,mki),
(β, pi)← BGS.Blind(Com(σ2, r1), r2)
Ui→ EN: g
x1 , σ1, β, pi, φ
EN: VerifyZK(β, pi, φ, σ1)
EN: GS.Verify(σ1, g
x1)
EN: β˜ ← BGS.Sign(β, sbk)
EN: K1 = g
x1y1
EN← Ui: g
y1 , β˜, H(K1|hsK1)
Ui: σ3 ← BGS.Unblind(β˜, r2)
Ui: K1 = g
x1y1
When Ui initiates the handshake with EX, she sends the
group signature on gx2 that was blindly signed by EN, along
with the blind signature itself. If all the verifications suc-
ceed, then EX accepts the connection.
Exit Node Handshake:
Ui→ EX: g
x2 , σ2, σ3
EX: GS.Verify(σ2, g
x2)
EX: BGS.Verify(σ3, σ2)
EX: K2 = g
x2y2
EX→ Ui: g
y2 ,H(K2|hsK2)
Ui: K2 = g
x2y2
It is important to note that the group signatures are en-
crypted using the public keys of either the entry or exit
nodes. Hence, only the entry and exit nodes learn them.
Moreover, the group signature sent to the exit node is blindly
signed by the entry node. Thus, even if both nodes collude,
they would not be able to determine by themselves that the
group signatures they have received have been issued by the
same user, due to the unlinkability property of the group
signature scheme and the blindness property of the blind
signature scheme. Moreover, since the group signature sent
to the exit node has been blindly signed by the entry node,
it is not possible for a user Ui to frame another user Uj .
The modified key negotiation with the entry node is de-
picted in Fig. 1, and the one corresponding to the exit node
is depicted in Fig. 2.
User OR1 = EN
1. {gx1 , σ1, β, pi, φ}PKOR1
2. gy1 , β˜, H(K1|hsK1)
Figure 1: The user sends to the entry node a group signature
of her share of the key, encrypted with the node’s public key,
and a blinded version of the group signature to be sent to the
exit node. The entry node returns a blindly signed version
of the latter.
5.1 How to block misbehaving users
Let us assume that some user Ui has been revoked due
to some illegitimate behavior. When Ui tries to establish a
circuit, he/she will need to perform a handshake with the
User
OR1 = EN
OR2
ORn−1
ORn = EX
1. {{gx2 , σ2, σ3}}
2. {{gx2 , σ2, σ3)}}
3. {{gx2 , σ2, σ3}}
4. {{gy2 , H(K2|hsK2)}}
5. {{gy2 , H(K2|hsK2)}}
6. {{gy2 , H(K2|hsK2)}}
Figure 2: The user sends to the exit node a group signature
of her share of the key, encrypted with the node’s public key
and the blind signature issued by the entry node.
chosen Tor entry node. Hence, upon receiving the first mes-
sage with the group signature, the entry node will verify the
received group signature, checking whether or not the mem-
ber who issued it has been revoked. Given that the member
key of Ui has been revoked, the verification will fail, and
the entry node will reject the connection. Note that if the
user has not been revoked, the privacy guarantees provided
by Tor are not diminished.
5.2 How to denounce misbehaving users
In this case, we assume that Ui has already established a
circuit and she is communicating with some server S (exter-
nal to Tor). Also, let us suppose that eventually, Ui performs
some illegitimate action. When that happens, S denounces
this behavior following some predefined method. If deemed
appropriate, the group signature received by the exit node
during the handshake may be used to retrieve Ui’s identity,
or to trace her. Specifically, the exit node provides the fol-
lowing information:
• {msg}K , where msg is the message received and de-
nounced by S, and K is the symmetric key negotiated
between Ui and the exit node.
• (K = gx2y2 , gx2), where gx2 is Ui’s share of the hand-
shake and gy2 is the share created by the exit node.
• σ2, i.e., a group signature of g
x2 issued by Ui.
In order to verify that the received denounce is valid, it is
necessary to check that the message received from S, msg,
corresponds to the encryption {msg}K received from the
exit node. Also, σ2 must be a valid group signature over
gx2 . Finally, the exit node may be required to prove that it
knows the discrete logarithm y2 of g
x2y2 to the base gx2 . If
these checks succeed, then the member with key mki (Ui) is
responsible of msg. Hence, Ui’s key can be consequently re-
voked, and the circuit may be closed by the exit node. Note
that subsequent attempts made by Ui to establish a circuit
would be blocked by the entry node, since the member key
of Ui has been revoked.
5.3 Additional remarks
A few remarks are worth to be made, concerning “special”
situations and subjects that should be taken into account.
Tor bridges Our proposal is directly extensible to support
Tor bridges, considering Tor bridges as the entry nodes
to the Tor network.
Leaky pipe topology This approach allows a client to out-
put some packets through a node other than the ne-
gotiated exit. In order to adapt our approach to this
exception, the node leaking the packet should follow
ad-hoc the procedure defined for exit nodes.
Logging Since hosts being accessed through these fair Tor
extension might want to issue denounces against traffic
originated from Tor, logging the information necessary
for solving disputes is required. Hence, the exit nodes
need to keep the information specified in Section 5.2
(this also applies to the leaky pipe extension). An
appropriate policy for logging should be established.
Denunciation time span Considering that our proposal
requires Tor exit nodes (and circumstantially other
nodes) to log several pieces of information, it would
comprise a serious scalability problem if this logging
would be expected to last too much time. Hence, it
seems appropriate to establish a predetermined time
span for accepting denounces. Upon expiration of that
time span, all the logged information could be removed,
and any subsequent denounce related to that infor-
mation rejected. This would require possible com-
plainants to be aware of this time limitation.
6. OPEN ISSUES
In the scheme given in Section 5 we just use the general
definitions of the building blocks for defining our system.
The analysis of which specific variants should be employed
is left as future work. Note that this is a very delicate deci-
sion, since different options offer different privacy properties.
Moreover, we may even need different schemes depending on
who issues the signatures (e.g. group signatures are issued
both by users and entry points in our proposal). Thus, given
the sensitivity of the information managed by Tor, this is an
issue that needs to be studied in depth by itself. For that
matter, the extensible group signatures library libgroupsig
[16] may offer interesting features. In addition, concerning
the blind signatures, it would probably be necessary to use
some of its variant to prevent circumventing the controls ex-
plaining above. Namely, with the previous bare scheme, a
user could use the same blind signature indefinitely. This
may simply be solved by using partially blind signatures,
and having the entry node introduce a lifetime value for the
blind signature as common message.
Another important issues are determining when misbe-
having users should be revoked, and by whom. The former
question would probably depend on the websites (or service)
being accessed through Tor. For the latter, a probably good
solution given Tor’s infrastructure would be to apply thresh-
old schemes to the revocation procedures (see [4]), such that
a majority of the authorities participating in the network
consensus need to agree for revoking users.
Finally, note that Sybil attacks [18] are partly addressed
by forcing users to use the same member key for the group
signature sent to the entry node and for the group signature
sent to the exit node (and having the latter to be blindly
signed by the entry node). However, some additional mecha-
nism should be included for preventing users from arbitrarily
generating new member keys. Since asking users to regis-
ter may not be well received (it may be seem as a threat
to anonymity), requesting them to perform some proof of
work [19] during the generation of the member keys may be
a good alternative.
7. CONCLUSION
In this work we have proposed an extension to the Tor
network in order to endow it with the functionality for pre-
venting misbehaving users to access the network. We expect
such functionality to increase the trust of websites in Tor and
thus prevent them to block users coming from it. This ex-
tension follows the design of Tor, and does not require any
modification to its infrastructure. It works by including two
group signatures in the key negotiation processes with the
entry and exit nodes (one for each) and having the entry
node blindly sign the group signature to be sent to the exit
node. The group signature sent to the exit node allows ser-
vice providers to denounce illegitimate actions. Once the
unlinkability of a user has been revoked as a consequence of
some illegitimate behavior, any entry node would be able to
block that specific user just by checking if it is included in
an (unlinkability) Revocation List.
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